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When Smoothness is Not Enough:
Toward Exact Quantification and Optimization of the Price-of-Anarchy
Rahul Chandan Dario Paccagnan Jason R. Marden
Abstract—Today’s multiagent systems have grown too
complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting in-
creasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms.
In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable
tool to complement more traditional techniques. The fun-
damental idea behind this approach is the assignment of
agents’ local cost functions, such that their selfish min-
imization attains, or is provably close to, the global objec-
tive. Any algorithm capable of computing an equilibrium of
the corresponding game inherits an approximation ratio that
is, in the worst case, equal to its price-of-anarchy. Therefore,
a successful application of the game design approach hinges
on the possibility to quantify and optimize the equilibrium
performance.
Toward this end, we introduce the notion of generalized
smoothness, and show that the resulting efficiency bounds
are significantly tighter compared to those obtained using
the traditional smoothness approach. Leveraging this newly-
introduced notion, we quantify the equilibrium performance
for the class of local resource allocation games. Finally, we
show how the agents’ local decision rules can be designed in
order to optimize the efficiency of the corresponding equilibria,
by means of a tractable linear program.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest in the field of multiagent systems’ control has
experienced rapid growth in recent years, as a variety of
application domains have emerged [1], [2]. The impact of
recent advancements in multiagent control has been far-
reaching, revolutionizing traditional industries such as trans-
portation and power networks [3], [4], [5], while also driving
the development of novel technologies including robotic
swarms and self-driving cars [6], [7].
Modern multiagent systems must adhere to imposing
constraints with regards to their spatial distribution, overall
scale, privacy requirements and communication bandwidth.
As a consequence, the coordination of such systems does
not allow for centralized decision making, but instead re-
quires the use of distributed protocols. Ideally, a distributed
algorithm will meet the system’s requirements for scalability,
communication bandwidth, and security, while achieving the
desired global objective.
A well-established and fruitful approach to tackle this class
of problems consists in the design of a centralized max-
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imization algorithm, that is later distributed by leveraging
the structure of the problem considered, e.g., [8], [9]. An
alternative approach, termed game design, has emerged in
parallel as a valuable tool to complement the aforementioned
design philosophy [10]. Instead of directly specifying the
decision-making process, local cost functions are assigned
to the system’s agents such that their selfish minimization
results in the achievement of the system-level objective.
The advantages of using this approach are two-fold: i) we
inherit a pool of algorithms that are distributed by nature,
asynchronous, and resilient to external disturbances [11];
and, ii) we obtain access to readily-available performance
certificates in the form of efficiency bounds. In fact, any
(distributed) algorithm capable of driving the system to an
equilibrium configuration (e.g. pure Nash equilibrium, mixed
Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, etc.) will inherit an
approximation ratio matching the corresponding worst-case
equilibrium efficiency, called the price-of-anarchy. Motivated
by the game-theoretic approach, we aim to develop novel
techniques to quantify and minimize the price-of-anarchy in
distributed systems.
A. Related Works
The characterization of the price-of-anarchy has received
significant research interest, particularly in the context of
atomic congestion games [12], [13], [14], [15]. Although
the smoothness framework provides exact price-of-anarchy
bounds for atomic congestion games [16], the derivation of
these bounds still requires a considerable amount of analysis.
In stark contrast, we construct tractable linear programs for
computing and optimizing the price-of-anarchy relative to
the class of local resource allocation games, without any
analysis. These linear programs extend the approach put-
forward in [17], [18].
As smoothness arguments have proven useful when char-
acterizing the performance of broad classes of equilibria
[19], they have also been applied to a variety of other
problems, including learning [20], and mechanism design
[21]. Unfortunately, as observed in [17] and proven later
in this manuscript, traditional smoothness arguments find
limited applicability in connection to design problems. Gen-
eralized smoothness is tailored to resolve this weakness,
while retaining all the strengths of the traditional smoothness
approach. This novel notion of smoothness is most similar
to the style of argument used in [15], [22] to quantify the
price-of-anarchy for covering problems.
B. Our Contributions
In this work, we introduce a broader notion of smoothness,
referred to as generalized smoothness, which allows us
to provide tighter bounds on the performance of coarse-
correlated equilibria. To demonstrate the strength of this
novel approach, we apply our result to local resource al-
location problems, and show that the bounds are tight. In
more detail, our contributions are as follows:
1) We demonstrate that price-of-anarchy bounds obtained
via smoothness arguments are not tight if the sum of
players’ local cost functions is not equal to the system
cost (Theorem 1).
2) We introduce the notion of generalized smoothness,
and show that, in general, it provides tighter bounds on
the price-of-anarchy compared to current smoothness
approaches (Theorems 2 and 3).
3) For the class of local resource allocation problems,
we show that generalized smoothness provides tight
bounds on the price-of-anarchy (Theorem 4). As a con-
sequence, we demonstrate how the price-of-anarchy
can be characterized (Theorem 5) and optimized (The-
orem 6) using tractable linear programs. Finally, we
show that many existing price-of-anarchy results, e.g.,
[12], [13], [14], can be reproduced by simply solving
a corresponding linear program.
For ease of presentation, many of the proofs are reported
in the appendix.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a class of resource allocation problems where
N = {1, . . . , n} denotes a set of agents, and each agent i
must select an action ai from a given action set Ai. The
system cost induced by allocation a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A =
A1 × · · · ×An is C(a), where C : A → R. Our objective is
to find an optimal allocation, i.e. an allocation aopt,
aopt ∈ argmin
a∈A
C(a). (1)
Since this class of combinatorial problems is inherently
intractable, in the remainder of the paper, we aim to obtain
an approximate solution to (1) through a distributed and
tractable algorithm, ideally with the best possible approx-
imation ratio1. We tackle the problem using the game-
theoric approach discussed in the introduction. Towards this
goal, for every instance of problem in (1), we introduce a
corresponding game where the agent set is N , each agent’s
action set is Ai, and in which each agent i evaluates its
actions using a local cost function Ji : A → R. In the
forthcoming analysis, we will focus on the solution concept
of Nash equilibrium, defined as any allocation ane ∈ A such
that,
Ji(a
ne) ≤ Ji(ai, a
ne
−i) ∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N, (2)
1For ease of presentation, most of our analysis will focus on Nash
equilibria, which are intractable to find, or even nonexistent, in general.
Nevertheless, we will show in Lemma 1 that our results generalize to the
much broader set of coarse-correlated equilibria, which can be found in
polynomial time for a broad class of games [23], and are guaranteed to
exist in a broader class of games than pure Nash equilibria [24].
where a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an). We represent the
game as defined above with the tuple G = (N,A, {Ji}, C),
where {Ji} = {J1, . . . , Jn}. We measure the equilibrium
performance in a given game using the notion of price-of-
anarchy,
PoA(G) :=
maxa∈NE(G) C(a)
mina∈AC(a)
, (3)
where NE(G) is the set of all pure Nash equilibria of
the game G. Informally, the price-of-anarchy describes the
ratio between the worst performing equilibrium and the
optimal allocation. A lower price-of-anarchy is indicative
of higher overall equilibrium performance. As such, the
price-of-anarchy is an upper-bound on the efficiency of any
equilibrium in the game. In cases where we have a family
of games G, the price-of-anarchy is further defined as,
PoA(G) := sup
G∈G
PoA(G). (4)
Our work centers around the following two questions:
1) Given a class of cost-minimization games, how do we
quantify the price-of-anarchy?
2) How can agents’ local cost functions be designed in
order to minimize the price-of-anarchy?
III. THE SMOOTHNESS FRAMEWORK
The smoothness framework developed in [24] has proven
to be versatile, bringing a number of different price-of-
anarchy results under a common analytical language, and
producing tight bounds on the price-of-anarchy for different
classes of problems [16], [25]. In this section, we revisit
the notion of smooth games, and recall how smoothness
arguments are employed to bound the corresponding price-
of-anarchy. The cost-minimization game G is (λ, µ)-smooth
if
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a) for all a ∈ A, and if, for any two
allocations a, a′ ∈ A, there exist λ > 0 and µ < 1 such that
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
′
i, a−i) ≤ λC(a
′) + µC(a). (5)
The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-smooth game G is upper-
bounded as PoA(G) ≤ λ/(1− µ).
Observe that if all games in a class G can be shown to
be (λ, µ)-smooth, then PoA(G) is also upper-bounded by
λ/(1−µ). Accordingly, the best price-of-anarchy bound that
can be derived using the smoothness framework, termed the
robust price-of-anarchy [24], is given by,
RPoA(G) := inf
λ>0,µ<1
{
λ
1− µ
s.t. (5) holds ∀G ∈ G
}
.
(6)
Note that, in general, PoA(G) ≤ RPoA(G). Fortunately,
PoA(G) = RPoA(G) for the well-studied class of congestion
games, in which
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) = C(a) for all a ∈ A, see [24].
However, smoothness arguments are not applicable to
games where
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) < C(a) even for only one a ∈ A.
Additionally, the robust price-of-anarchy does not provide a
tight bound when
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) > C(a) for all a ∈ A, as we
demonstrate in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For a given game G, assume
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) >
C(a) holds for all a ∈ A. Then,
RPoA(G) > PoA(G). (7)
Proof. By assumption, there must exist γ > 1 such that∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ γC(a) for all a ∈ A. Observe that, for λ > 0
and µ < 1 as in (5),
γC(ane) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
ne) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt, ane−i)
≤ λC(aopt) + µC(ane),
where the above inequalities hold by assumption, by (2), and
by (5), respectively. As the equilibrium conditions in (2) are
scale-invariant, it must be that
PoA(G) ≤
λ∗
γ − µ∗
<
λ∗
1− µ∗
= RPoA(G),
where λ∗ > 0, µ∗ < 1 optimize (6).
IV. GENERALIZED SMOOTHNESS
In the previous section, we showed that traditional smooth-
ness arguments are unsuitable for bounding equilibrium
performance when the sum of agents’ local costs is not equal
to the system cost. In the following, we introduce a new
notion of smoothness that provides tight bounds for a broader
class of games.
Theorem 2 (Generalized Smoothness). Suppose there exist
λ > 0 and µ < 1 such that for every game G ∈ G, and any
two action profiles a, a′ ∈ A,
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
′
i, a−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a)+C(a) ≤ λC(a
′)+µC(a). (8)
Then, the price-of-anarchy satisfies,
PoA(G) ≤
λ
1− µ
.
Proof. For all G ∈ G, for all ane ∈ NE(G) and aopt ∈ A,
C(a) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i)−
n∑
i=1
Ji(a
ne) + C(a)
≤ λC(aopt) + µC(ane),
(9)
where the first inequality holds by (2), and the second, by
(8). Rearranging (9), one gets the desired result.
We use the name generalized smoothness as this novel
notion of smoothness reduces to traditional smoothness when∑n
i=1 Ji(a) = C(a). Observe that generalized smoothness
does not even require
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a), and thus applies
to a much broader class of games. In parallel to the previous
section, we define the generalized price-of-anarchy as the
best price-of-anarchy bound that can be derived using the
generalized smoothness framework,
GPoA(G) := inf
λ>0,µ<1
{
λ
1− µ
s.t. (8) holds ∀G ∈ G
}
.
(10)
In the following theorem, we demonstrate that the bounds
obtained using the generalized smoothness framework are
always better than those provided by traditional smoothness.
Theorem 3. For all games G ∈ G s.t.
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) ≥ C(a),
PoA(G) ≤ GPoA(G) ≤ RPoA(G).
Additionally, if for all a ∈ A,
∑n
i=1 Ji(a) > C(a). Then,
GPoA(G) < RPoA(G).
Since the result in Theorem 3 holds for every game in the
class G, the inequalities hold with G in the place of G, i.e.
for the whole class.
V. LOCAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAMES
In this section, we introduce the specialized class of
local resource allocation games. We then show that the
generalized smoothness framework provides concrete and
tight bounds on the price-of-anarchy relative to this class.
This analysis will extend the applicability of the linear pro-
gramming approach presented in [18] to all coarse-correlated
equilibria and to multiple resource types.
Consider a game G with agent set N = {1, . . . , n}, and
a finite set of resources R, where every resource r ∈ R has
a cost function cr : N → R, and a cost-generating function
fr : N → R. Each agent i ∈ N is associated with an action
set Ai ⊆ 2
R. For a given allocation a ∈ A, we define the
system cost and local cost functions as,
C(a) =
∑
r∈R
cr(|a|r),
Ji(ai, a−i) =
∑
r∈ai
fr(|a|r),
where |a|r is the number of agents selecting resource r in
allocation a. We adopt the convention that cr(0) = 0 for all
r ∈ R, without loss of generality. We identify the aforemen-
tioned game with the tuple G = (n,R,A, {(cr, fr)}r∈R).
We define a scalable class of local resource allocation
games GnT as the set of all n-player local resource allocation
games in which, for every resource r ∈ R, there exists
vr ≥ 0 such that cr(·) = vr · c(·) and fr(·) = vrf(·).
The pair of functions (c, f) is drawn from a finite set of
resource types T = {(c1, f1), . . . , (cm, fm)}. We refer to the
functions {ft}
m
t=1 as distribution rules, since each function
ft describes how the value vr of its corresponding resource
is split among the agents.
We observe that many classes of problems studied in
the literature can be analyzed using this model. Important
examples include vehicle-target assignment problems [11],
set covering problems [15], [22], and atomic congestion
games [12], [13], [14]. Before presenting our results, we
demonstrate the generality of the local resource allocation
problem formulation in the next subsection, using the exam-
ple of atomic congestion games.
S T
ℓ1(x) = v1x ℓ2(x) = v2
ℓ3(x) = v3x ℓ4(x) = v4
Fig. 1: A simple congestion game with affine latency functions that
can be represented as a local resource allocation problem with two
types, T = {(x2, x), (x, 1)}. The system’s n agents must select
either the top path or the bottom path to travel from node S to
node T , and experience the corresponding latency.
A. An Illustrative Example: Atomic Congestion Games
To demonstrate the generality of the local resource alloca-
tion problem presented above, we analyze congestion games,
a classical cost-minimization problem [26]. A congestion
game consists of a player set N = {1, . . . , n}, and a finite
set of edges E, where every player i ∈ N selects a path
ai from its corresponding set of paths Ai ⊆ 2
E . Each edge
e ∈ E is associated with a latency function ℓe : N → R.
For a given allocation a = (a1, . . . , an), the system cost and
local cost functions are defined as
C(a) =
∑
e∈E
ℓe(|a|e) |a|e,
Ji(ai, a−i) =
∑
e∈ai
ℓe(|a|e).
Observe that, in this context, a congestion game can be
modelled as a local resource allocation game, where the set
of edges corresponds to the set of resources, i.e. R = E, the
latency functions ℓr play the role of distribution rules fr,
and cr is substituted with ℓr(x) · x for every r ∈ R.
Congestion games with affine latencies [13]. A special class
of atomic congestion games is that of affine congestion
games, in which the edge latency functions are restricted
to the form ℓe(x) = aex + be, where ae, be ≥ 0 for all
e ∈ E. The class of affine congestion games is equivalent
to the class of local resource allocation problems with two
resource types; T = {(x2, x), (x, 1)}.2
As an elementary example, consider an n-player game
with resources R = {rj}
4
j=1, each with value vj ≥ 0. The
resources r1 and r3 are associated with type (x
2, x), whereas
r2 and r4 have type (x, 1). For every agent i ∈ N , we
define the action set Ai = {a1, a2} with a1 = (r1, r2) and
a2 = (r3, r4). Observe that this game can be represented
by the two-link network shown in Fig. 1, where Ji(a) =
v1|a|r1 + v2 for an agent i that selects action (r1, r2), and
Ji(a) = v3|a|r3 + v4 for agents selecting action (r3, r4).
While we consider the simplistic example of a two-link
network here, we note that, in general, any affine congestion
game can be represented as a local resource allocation game
2Informally, this means that there are two edge types in the congestion
game, those that impose a latency proportional to the number of agents
selecting them, and those that have constant latency.
with T as above. Furthermore, given a basis set for all
possible edge latency functions, any atomic congestion game
can be formulated using our model.
B. Computing the price-of-anarchy
The next theorem shows how the price-of-anarchy of a
scalable class of local resource allocation games can be
recovered by means of the notion of generalized smoothness
previously defined in (8). Before proceeding, we introduce
some notation. Let
I :={(x, y, z)∈N3 | 1 ≤ x+ y − z ≤ n, z ≤ min{x, y}},
IR :={(x, y, z)∈I |x+ y − z=n or (x − z)(y − z)z=0}.
Theorem 4. Given set of types T , and positive integer n,
it holds that PoA(GnT) = GPoA(G
n
T). Furthermore, there
exists an n-player game G ∈ GnT with |R| ≤ 2n, and
PoA(G) = GPoA(GnT).
The above theorem shows that generalized smoothness ar-
guments provide tight upper-bounds on the price-of-anarchy
in local resource allocation games, and proposes a method-
ology for constructing worst-case instances. We now exploit
this result to obtain easily computable and concrete bounds
on the price-of-anarchy.
Theorem 5. Given set of types T , and positive integer n,
PoA(GnT) = 1/C
∗, where C∗ is the value of the following
linear program,
C∗ = max
ν∈R≥0,ρ∈R
ρ (11)
s.t. c(y)− ρc(x) + ν [(x−z)f(x)− (y−z)f(x+1)] ≥ 0
∀(c, f) ∈ T , ∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR,
where we set c(0) = f(0) = f(n+1) = 0, for all (c, f) ∈ T .
Although all (c, f) ∈ T were previously defined as
mappings from N → R, we extend their definitions to ease
the notation. Note that the result in the above theorem can be
used to derive exact price-of-anarchy bounds in, e.g., atomic
congestion games, see Table 1 in Section V-D.
C. Optimizing the price-of-anarchy
Whereas the previous subsection was devoted to calculat-
ing the price-of-anarchy for given set of types T , we now
shift our focus to designing a set of distribution rules that
minimize the price-of-anarchy.
Theorem 6. Consider the cost functions {c1, . . . , cm}, and
positive integer n. An optimal set of distribution rules
fOPT = {f
∗
1 , . . . , f
∗
m} such that
fOPT ∈ argmin
f∈Rn×m
≥0
PoA(GnT ), (12)
is given by the solutions to
(f∗t ,ρ
∗
t ) ∈ argmax
f∈Rn,ρ∈R
ρ (13)
s.t. ct(y)− ρct(x) + (x−z)f(x)− (y−z)f(x+1) ≥ 0,
∀(x, y, z) ∈ IR, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
where we set c(0) = f(0) = f(n+1) = 0, for all (c, f) ∈ T .
For the set of types T ∗ = {(ct, f
∗
t )}
m
t=1,
PoA(GnT∗) = max
t∈{1,...,m}
1
ρ∗t
. (14)
Theorem 6 shows that a set of optimal distribution rules
can be calculated using the linear program (13). It is worth
noting that for a given class of games GnT with an arbitrary
set of types T , it is not possible, in general, to compute
the price-of-anarchy as the worst price-of-anarchy over each
individual pair (ct, ft), i.e. the expression
PoA(GnT ) = max
(c,f)∈T
{
PoA
(
Gn{(c,f)}
)}
does not hold. Nevertheless, this property is recovered for
the specific choice of ft = f
∗
t . This constitutes the key
observation towards proving Theorem 6.
D. Returning to Atomic Congestion Games
Here we apply the results presented in this section to the
class of congestion games, as discussed in Section V-A.
Characterizing PoA in congestion games. Deriving the
smoothness parameters for a given class of congestion games
is difficult. For example, in the main result of [12], the
authors exploit a nontrivial polynomial inequality in order to
find the optimal smoothness parameters for the class of affine
congestion games, and prove that the price-of-anarchy of this
class is 5/2. A direct application of the linear program in
Theorem 5 recovers the same result for any number of agents
greater than 3. Additionally, we determine a worst-case
instance construction with only three agents3. In Table 1, we
compile price-of-anarchy bounds obtained using the linear
program in Theorem 5 for five classes of atomic congestion
games, along with their corresponding optimal smoothness
parameters. We note that, while the price-of-anarchy bounds
that we present for the first three classes of congestion games
(i.e. affine, quadratic, and cubic) have already been obtained
(see [12], [13], [14]), the bounds reported for classes of
square root, and logarithmic congestion games are novel.
Optimizing PoA in congestion games. The idea of improving
the price-of-anarchy in congestion games using a local edge
toll as a control mechanism originates from [27]. In order to
influence agents’ decisions, a toll τe is added to the agents’
local edge costs such that,
Ji(ai, a−i) =
∑
e∈ai
ℓe(|a|e) + τe(|a|e).
The system cost remains unchanged. When traffic in a
network is modelled as a continuum of agents – termed
3Consider the game G with six edges {ei}6i=1 with identical value
(i.e. ve = v) and latency function ℓe(x) = x. We endow the n =
3 agents with the action sets, A1 = {(e4, e5, e6), (e1, e2)}, A2 =
{(e1, e2, e5), (e3, e4)}, and A3 = {(e1, e3, e4), (e5, e6)}. The Nash
equilibrium ane corresponds to each agent selecting its three-tuple action,
and the optimal actions in aopt are the two-tuple actions. It can easily
be verified that (2) is met. PoA(G) = 5/2, since the system costs are
C(ane) = 15v and C(aopt) = 6v. Note that, in general, drawing a worst-
case instance as a graph requires additional edges e with value ve = 0.
TABLE 1: Exact price-of-anarchy bounds, and optimal smoothness
parameters, for five classes of atomic congestion games. These were
computed using the linear program in Theorem 5 for n = 25. The
bounds we obtain for affine, quadratic, and cubic congestion games
match the tight bounds obtained for infinite player games in [12],
[13], [14]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report
bounds for square root, and logarithmic congestion games.
Class Basis λ∗ µ∗ PoA Reference
Affine {x, 1} 5/3 1/3 5/2 [12], [13]
Quadratic {x2, x, 1} 6.05 0.368 9.58 [14]
Cubic {x3, . . . , 1} 17.89 0.569 41.5 [14]
Square Root {√x} 1.24 0.174 1.50 –
Logarithmic {log(x)+1} 1.523 0.17 1.835 –
the nonatomic setting – it has been shown that there is a
unique system equilibrium achieving PoA(G) = 1 when
agents are optimally tolled [28]. In the setting of atomic
congestion games, where the agents are modelled as finite,
indivisible entities, the problem of minimizing the price-of-
anarchy using tolls becomes much more challenging, as a
given game will have multiple equilibria, in general. The
approach presented here can be used to design a set of tolls
τe that minimize the price-of-anarchy, see [29].
VI. EXTENSIONS
In this section, we demonstrate that the above results
extend to A. Coarse-Correlated Equilibria; and, B. Welfare-
Maximization Problems.
A. Coarse-Correlated Equilibria
A significant advantage of using a smoothness argument
is that it provides performance bounds for the class of
coarse-correlated equilibria, a far broader class of equilibria
compared to the class of pure Nash equilibria [16], [30]. A
coarse-correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution σ
over all allocations a ∈ A such that for all i ∈ [n], and
a′ ∈ A, it holds that,
Ea∼σ[Ji(a)] =
∑
a∈A
σ(a)Ji(a) ≤ Ea∼σ[Ji(a
′
i, a−i)],
where σ(a) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability associated with action
a ∈ A in the distribution σ. Next, we show that the price-
of-anarchy bounds stemming from generalized smoothness
arguments extend to all coarse-correlated equilibria.
Lemma 1. For every game G in the class of games G,
GPoA(G) ≥
maxσ∈CCE(G) Ea∼σ[C(a)]
mina∈AC(a)
,
where CCE(G) is the set of all coarse-correlated equilibria
of the game G.
Since the sets of pure and mixed Nash equilibria of a game
are subsets of its coarse-correlated equilibria, the GPoA is
an upper-bound on the efficiency of all equilibria within
these classes. This result is particularly important toward the
tractability of the final algorithm. Indeed, although finding a
pure Nash equilibrium can be intractable, coarse-correlated
equilibria can often be computed in polynomial time [23].
B. Welfare-Maximization Problems
Welfare-maximization problems consist of an agent set N ,
where each agent i ∈ N is associated with a finite action set
Ai. The global objective in to maximize the system welfare
function W : A → R, i.e. we wish to find the allocation
aopt ∈ argmaxa∈AW (a). As in the previous sections, we
consider a game-theoretic model where each agent i ∈ N is
associated with a local utility function Ui : A → R which
it uses to evaluate its own actions. We represent a welfare-
maximization game with a tuple G = (N,A,W, {Ui}).
Given a game G, a Nash equilibrium is defined as any
allocation ane ∈ A such that Ui(a
ne) ≥ Ui(ai, a
ne
−i) for all
ai ∈ Ai and all i ∈ N . The price-of-anarchy in welfare-
maximization games is defined as
PoA(G) =
mina∈NE(G)W(a)
maxa∈AW(a)
, PoA(G) = inf
G∈G
PoA(G).
Note that according to this definition, the price-of-anarchy
in welfare-maximization games is bounded from below by
0, and from above by 1.
Although the focus of this paper is on cost-minimization
games, we note that analogues to all of our results can be
derived in the context of welfare-maximization games with
minor modification to the generalized smoothness condi-
tion. A welfare-maximization game G is (λ, µ)-generalized
smooth if, for all allocations a, a′ ∈ A, it holds that,∑
i∈[n]
Ui(a
′
i, a−i)−
∑
i∈[n]
Ui(a) +W (a) ≥ λW (a
′)− µW (a).
The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-generalized smooth game is
lower-bounded by λ/(1 + µ), for this class of problems.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this manuscript, we provided a novel methodology
for characterizing and optimizing the price-of-anarchy in
connection to a broad class of problems, including con-
gestion games. Toward this goal, we introduced the notion
of generalized smoothness. Compared to traditional smooth-
ness arguments, we showed that generalized smoothness is
more widely applicable, and provides tighter bounds. We
applied generalized smoothness arguments to the class of
local resource allocation problems (which include congestion
games) and observed that it provides tight bounds on the
price-of-anarchy. Relative to this class of problems, we were
able to compute and optimize the price-of-anarchy of coarse-
correlated equilibria, by means of concrete and tractable
linear programs. Along with other possible future research
directions, this work paves the way for the design of optimal
tolling schemes through the linear programming framework
introduced in [17], [18].
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. When
∑
i∈N Ji(a) = C(a), (8) is equivalent to (5).
When
∑
i∈N Ji(a) > C(a), for all λ, µ satisfying (5), the
following must hold for all a, a∗ ∈ A,∑
i∈[n]
Ji(a
∗
i , a−i)−
∑
i∈[n]
Ji(a)+C(a) < λC(a
∗)+µC(a).
Thus, there must exist some ǫ > 0 such that (8) holds for
λ¯ = λ∗ − ǫ or µ¯ = µ∗ − ǫ, where λ∗, µ∗ optimize (6).
Since λ/(1 − µ) is increasing in both λ and µ, GPoA <
λ∗/(1− µ∗) = RPoA.
Preliminaries to the proof of Theorem 4
Definition 1. S(GnT ) is the set of parameters λ > 0, µ < 1
such that, for all (ct, f t) ∈ T and all (x, y, z) ∈ IR,
(z− x)f t(x)+ (y− z)f t(x+1)+ ct(x) ≤ λct(y)+µct(x).
(15)
Definition 2. γ(GnT ) is defined as,
γ(GnT ) := inf
λ,µ
{
λ
1− µ
: (λ, µ) ∈ S(GnT )
}
(16)
Lemma 2. For the given class of games GnT ,
γ(GnT ) ≥ GPoA(G
n
T ).
Proof. Let |ane| = {x1, . . . , xm}, and |a
opt| = {y1, . . . , ym}.
We define zr as the number of agents that select resource r
in both ane and aopt,
zr := |{i ∈ N : r ∈ a
ne
i } ∩ {i ∈ N : r ∈ a
opt
i }|
where zr ≤ min{xr, yr}, and 1 ≤ xr + yr − zr ≤ n.
The following simplification, adapted from [31], is instru-
mental in our proof of tightness,∑
i∈[n]
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i)−
∑
i∈[n]
Ji(a
ne) + C(ane) (17)
=
∑
r∈R
[zrfr(xr) + (yr − zr)fr(xr + 1)]
−
∑
r∈R
xrfr(xr) +
∑
r∈R
cr(xr)
=
∑
r∈R
[(zr−xr)fr(xr)+(yr−zr)fr(xr+1)+cr(xr)] .
We have shown that (17) can be represented as a sum over a
subset of the left-hand side expressions in (15) corresponding
to the resources in R weighted by their values. For the proof
that it is sufficient to consider (x, y, z) ∈ IR, see the second
part of the proof of [18, Thm. 2], and note that (x, y, z) in this
paper are equivalent to (j, l, x) in their notation. Thus, the
parameters (λ, µ) ∈ S(GnT ) are sure to satisfy the constraint
in (8). This is because C(ane) is guaranteed to be less than
or equal to (17). This implies that γ(GnT ) ≥ GPoA(G
n
T).
Lemma 3. Consider the class of games GnT . Suppose there
exist (λˆ, µˆ) ∈ S(GnT ) such that,
λˆ
1− µˆ
= γ(GnT ).
Then, there must be (c1, f1), (c2, f2) in T , (x1, y1, z1),
(x2, y2, z2) in IR, and η ∈ [0, 1] such that,
(zj − xj)f
j(xj) + (yj − zj)f
j(xj + 1) + c
j(xj)
= λˆ cj(yj) + µˆ c
j(xj)
(18)
for j = 1, 2; and,
η[z1 f
1(x1) + (y1 − z1) f
1(x1 + 1)]
+ (1−η)[z2 f
2(x2) + (y2 − z2) f
2(x2 + 1)]
= η x1 f
1(x1) + (1 − η)x2 f
2(x2).
(19)
Proof. We defineHc,f,x,y,z as the set of (λ, µ) ∈ R>0×R<1
that satisfy, for given c, f , x, y and z,
(z−x)f(x)+(y−z)f(x+1)+c(x)≤ λ c(y)+µ c(x).
We denote by δHc,f,x,y,z the boundary of the set, i.e. the
points (λ, µ) that satisfy the above inequality with equality.
Some simplifications can be made for the cases when either
x = 0 or y = 0. When x = 0 and y > 0, then z = 0 =
min{x, y}, and the set Hc,f,0,y,0 contains all µ < 1, and
all λ ≥ f(1)y/c(y). When x > 0 and y = 0, z = 0 once
again, the set Hc,f,x,0,0 contains all λ > 0, and all µ ≥
1 − xf(x)/c(x). For the halfplanes with x > 0 and y > 0,
the boundary is,
µ = −
c(y)
c(x)
λ+
1
c(x)
[
(z − x)f(x)+
(y − z)f(x+ 1) + c(x)
]
.
Note that finding γ(GnT ) is equivalent to finding the point
along the boundary that intersects the line with µ-intercept
equal to 1 with the most negative slope. Thus, we can
find the optimal (λ, µ) by starting on the boundary at
λ = maxy f(1)y/c(y), then following the boundary until
we reach a line with µ-intercept less than 1. There are three
possibilities for the optimal λ, µ: at λ = maxy f(1)y/c(y), at
the intersection of two halfplanes with x1, x2 > 0, y1, y2 >
0, z1, z2 ≥ 0, or at µ = 1−minx xf(x)/c(x).
If the optimal λ, µ occurs at λ = maxy f(1)y/c(y), then
x1 = 0, y1 > 0 and z1 = 0, and the other halfplane has
µ-intercept less than one, and x2 > 0, y2 ≥ 0 and z2 ≥ 0.
Note that it is also possible for the optimal λ, µ to occur at
λ = maxy>0 f(1)y/c(y) and µ = 1−minx>0 xf(x)/C(x).
For all these cases, there exists η ∈ [0, 1] such that,
η [z1 f
1(x1) + (y1 − z1) f
1(x1 + 1)]
+ (1− η) [z2 f
2(x2) + (y2 − z2) f
2(x2 + 1)]
= ηx1f
1(x1) + (1− η)x2f
2(x2)
If the optimal (λ, µ) occur on a halfplane Hc,f,x,y,z with
µ-intercept equal to 1, we select c1 = c2 = c, f
1 = f2 = f ,
x1 = x2 = x, y1 = y2 = y and z1 = z2 = z, where any
η ∈ [0, 1] will satisfy the equality.
Lemma 4. For the class of games GnT , suppose no point
(λ, µ) ∈ S(GnT ) satisfies
λ
1−µ = γ(G
n
T ). Then, there exists
(f, c) ∈ T and (x, y, z) ∈ IR such that
γ(GnT ) =
c(x)
c(y)
(20)
(y − z)f(x+ 1) + zf(x) > xf(x) (21)
Proof. Borrowing the notation and reasoning of the proof
for Lemma 3, we know that the strictest constraint must
come from a line corresponding to some (f, c) ∈ T that
for some values of x, y and z has µ-intercept greater than
1, and the least negative slope among all constraints. Since
the µ-intercept is greater than 1, (z−x)f(x)+(y−z)f(x+
1) > 0, which implies that (y − z)f(x + 1) + zf(x) >
xf(x). The least negative slope results from selecting y =
argminj∈N c(j) and x = argmaxj∈N c(j). Much like in
[24, Lem. 5.5], we construct a sequence {(λk, µk)} in S(G
n
T )
such that λk1−µk ↓ γ(G
n
t ). Since
λ
1−µ is increasing in both λ
and µ, it can be assumed that every point (λk, µk) lies on
the boundary of S(GnT ). The values λk are bounded from
below by the constraints (15) where x = z = 0, and for finite
γ(GnT ), µk ≤ b < 1. Since
λ
1−µ is continuous,
λk
1−µk
↓ γ(Gnt )
and γ(Gnt ) is not attained, the sequence {λk, µk)} has no
limit point. Thus, after some rearranging of (15),
γ(GnT ) = lim
k→∞
λk
1− µk
= lim
k→∞
c(x)
c(y)
+
(z − x)f(x) + (y − z)f(x+ 1)
c(y)(1 − µk)
=
c(x)
c(y)
,
since µk → −∞, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We first consider the case where the value γ(GnT ) is
not attained for any point (λ, µ) ∈ S(GnT ) as in Lemma 4.
We recover the pair (f, c) ∈ T that result in the strictest
constraint at λ → ∞, µ → −∞, as well as the values
x, y and z that give the least negative slope. We setup a
game with l = min{x+y, n} resources organized in a cycle
and l agents, i.e. R = {r1, . . . , rl} and N = [l], where
every resource has type corresponding to the pair (f, c). Each
agent i ∈ [l] is endowed with two actions, the first is to
select x consecutive resources starting with ri and ending
with ri+x−1 mod l, while the second is to select y consecutive
resources ending with ri+z−1 mod l. Condition (21) implies
that the former strategy is a Nash equilibrium, and by (20),
the price-of-anarchy is at least
c(x)
c(y) = γ(G
n
T ), as required.
We retrieve (c1, f1), (c2, f2), (x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2) and
η; the optimality parameters as in Lemma 3, where γ(GnT )
is an upper-bound on GPoA(GnT ) and is guaranteed to be
attained, by Lemma 2 and Definition 1. The worst-case game
G is constructed in the following way, define two disjoint
cycles E1 and E2 each with l = min{max{x1 + y1, x2 +
y2}, n} resources enumerated from 1 to l. The resources in
E1 are assigned cost function c1, distribution rule f
1 and
value η, whereas the resources in E2 are assigned c2, f
2 and
(1−η). There are also l ≤ n players, enumerated 1 through l
and we restrict the action set A to two strategies, ane and aopt.
In the first strategy, each player i ∈ [l] selects x1 consecutive
resources in E1, [i, i + 1, . . . , i + x1 − 1] mod l, and x2
consecutive resources in E2 starting with resource i. In the
second strategy, player i selects y1 consecutive resources in
E1 ending with resource i− 1, and y2 consecutive resources
in E2 ending with resource i− 1.
We continue by demonstrating that the first strategy satis-
fies the conditions for a Nash equilibrium,
Ji(a
ne) = η x1 f
1(x1) + (1 − η)x2 f
2(x2)
= η [z1 f
1(x1) + (y1 − z1) f
1(x1 + 1)]
+ (1 − η) [z2 f
2(x2) + (y2 − z2) f
2(x2 + 1)] (22)
= Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i),
where (22) holds due to Lemma 3. Now we show that the
price-of-anarchy of the game is lower-bounded by γ(GnT ),
thus implying equality.
C(ane) = C(ane)−
k∑
i=1
Ji(a
ne) +
k∑
i=1
Ji(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i)
= k η
[
λˆ c1(y1) + µˆ c1(x1)
]
+ k (1 − η)
[
λˆ c2(y2) + µˆ c2(x2)
]
= λˆ C(aopt) + µˆ C(ane)
In the above, γ(GnT ) = PoA(G) ≤ PoA(G
n
T). Since γ(G
n
T ) ≥
GPoA(GnT ) ≥ PoA(G
n
T ) by Lemma 2, GPoA(G
n
T ) must be
tight.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We begin by noting that, by Definition 1, we need
only consider (x, y, z) ∈ IR when calculating the price-
of-anarchy in local resource allocation games. Observe that
the constraints in the linear program are equivalent to the
simplified conditions for (λ, µ)-generalized smoothness in
(15). The linear program constraints read as,
c(y)−ρ c(x)+ν [(x−z) f(x)−(y−z) f(x+1)]≥ 0,
for all (x, y, z) ∈ IR, where ρ =
1−µ
λ
, and ν = 1
λ
.
Substituting the expressions for ν and ρ into the above, and
rearranging, we are left with,
(z − x) f(x) + (y − z) f(x+ 1) + c(x)
≤ λ c(y) + µ c(x),
for all (x, y, z) ∈ IR, which is identical to (15) when there is
a single type. Next, observe that maximizing ρ is equivalent
to minimizing λ/(1− µ), which concludes the proof.
Lemma 5. For a given class of local resource allocation
games GnT , it holds that,
PoA(GnT ) ≥ max
t∈T
{PoA (Gn
t
)} . (23)
Proof. We begin by proving that it is impossible to have
PoA(GnT ) < maxt∈T {PoA(G
n
t )}. Simply note that the worst-
case game in Gn
t
for each t ∈ T is a member of the class of
games GnT .
Next, consider the class of games with n = 3, and
T = {T1, T2} = {(x
2, x), (x, x)}. By [18, Thm. 2], the
prices-of-anarchy for the games with the individual types are
PoA(G3T1) = 1.857 and PoA(G
3
T2
) = 2.0. But, PoA(GnT) =
2.6 by (11).
Lemma 6. For a given class of local resource allocation
games GnT , there exist scaling parameters αt ∈ R≥0, t ∈ |T |
such that,
PoA(Gnτ , n) = max
t∈T
{PoA(Gnt )},
where τ = {(ct, αtf
t)}
|T |
t=1.
Proof. We denote by (ν∗t , ρ
∗
t ) the solution to [18, Thm. 2]
for the class of games with one type, (ct, f t) ∈ T . First,
note that uniform scaling of the distribution rules does not
affect the equilibrium conditions, so PoA({(ct, αtf
t)}, n) =
PoA({(ct, f t)}, n) for all αt > 0 and all t ∈ T . Thus,
recalling Lemma 5,
PoA(Gnτ ) ≥ max
t∈T
{PoA(Gn
t
)},
where τ = {(ct, α1f
t)}
|T |
t=1. Select αt = ν
∗
t for all t ∈ [|T |],
such that τ := {(ct, ν∗t f
t)}
|T |
t=1. We define ρˆ := mint∈[|T |] ρ
∗
t .
By construction, (ρˆ, 1) satisfies all the constraints in (11) for
types in τ . Thus, PoA(Gnτ ) ≤ 1/ρˆ = maxt∈T {PoA(G
n
t
)}.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. By Lemma 5, the lowest achievable price-of-anarchy
is maxt∈T∗{PoA(G
n
t
)} where T ∗ := {(ct, f tOPT)}
|T |
t=1. Ad-
ditionally, each of the f tOPT minimizes its corresponding
PoA(Gnt ) by [18, Thm. 3]. Finally, we have that the following
statement,
PoA(GnT∗) = max
t∈T
{PoA(Gnt )},
holds by the construction of fOPT,t in [18, Thm. 3]; the linear
program already multiplies the distribution rule and λ∗t , and
it was shown in the proof of Lemma 6 that αt = λ
∗
t for all
t ∈ T is an optimal set of scaling parameters.
